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a b s t r a c t 
Current approaches to risk management stress the need for dynamic (i.e. continuous, ongoing) approaches 
to risk identiﬁcation as part of a planned resource application aimed at reducing the expected conse- 
quences of undesired outcomes for the object of the assessment. We contend that these approaches place 
insuﬃcient emphasis on the system knowledge available to the assessor, particularly in respect of three 
factors, namely the dynamic behavior of the system under threat, the role of human agents and the 
knowledge availability to those agents. 
In this paper we address the ﬁrst of these shortcomings, namely the mobilization of explicit system 
knowledge in the identiﬁcation of risks. We present a procedure for mobilizing quantitative and quali- 
tative dynamic system knowledge using the case of ﬂood threat to an electricity substation as a worked 
example. We assert that the approach described offers the potential of improving risk cognition by mo- 
bilizing system knowledge. 
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ). 
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2  1. Introduction 
This paper is about the identiﬁcation and assessment of sys-
tem risk, which is an early and important part of the process of
mitigation and control of those risks under conditions of limited
resource availability. We are concerned primarily with safety and
mission critical systems whose behavior is commonly conditioned
by the decisions and actions of human agents who form an inextri-
cable part of the system assets. We refer to this class of systems as
critical human activity systems, henceforth CHASs (vide Checkland,
1981 ). The example we use towards the end of the paper to illus-
trate our approach is that of the response to threats to electricity
supply of a ﬂood-threatened electricity sub-station. 
We observe four shortcomings in current approaches, namely
(1) insuﬃcient mobilization of the inherent dynamics of the sys-
tem, leading to an unnecessarily narrow cognition of risks; (2) lack
of attention to the human agency involved; (3) similarly to the role
of knowledge gaps and (4) issues of multiple deﬁnition by stake-
holders, known as plurality. 
We are concerned here with addressing the ﬁrst of these, offer-
ing a workable, dynamic, system-based risk identiﬁcation method-
ology upon which further work can extend to include treatment of∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: + 44 1392725966. 
E-mail address: j.h.powell@exeter.ac.uk , ozzertjie@gmail.com (J.H. Powell). 
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0377-2217/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article u2) to (4) above. We base our methodology on a qualitative mod-
ling approach in order to include the widest spread of available
nowledge about the system, much of which is, by its nature, non-
umerical. The subsequent use of numerical data is not precluded,
owever, since the qualitative approach also provides a method of
dentifying which numerical sources should be accessed by further,
ocused study, such as simulation. 
After a brief examination of the shortcomings of existing ap-
roaches, we describe the characteristics of the methodology, ap-
lying it to the particular case of the ﬂooding risk to a compo-
ent of the electrical distribution system, namely a distribution
ub-station located near the coast. 
. Shortcomings of existing approaches 
.1. General approach to CHASs 
We draw the following observations about existing approaches
o CHAS risk assessment. First, there is a tendency towards the
se of taxonomic and objective-based risk assessment ( AIRMIC,
larm, & IRM, 2010; Borodzicz, 20 05; Dorfman, 20 07; Trickey,
011 ). While such approaches implicate the internal behavioral
haracteristics of the object under assessment (the system behav-
or), there is little evidence of this important source of risk knowl-
dge being mobilized explicitly. There is thus a tendency both in
cademic literature and in practice to interpret the term ‘dynamic’nder the CC BY license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ). 
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Table 1 
Studies that have applied hard OR methods in the context of DOM and EOR. 
Hard OR method Application context Refs 
Math programming Evacuation planning under 
hurricane/ﬂood 
conditions. 
Sherali et al. (1991 ) 
Probability and 
statistics 
Anticipating catastrophes 
caused by rainfall. 
Coles and Perrichi (2003 ) 
Simulation Decision support system 
for evacuation planning 
in Taiwan. 
Han (1990 ) 
Decision theory Earthquake damage 
estimation & decision 
analysis for emergency 
shut-off of city gas 
networks. 
Cret, Yamazaki, Nagata, and 
Katayama (1993 ) 
Queuing theory Planning of an emergency 
ambulance service. 
Bell (1969 ) 
Fuzzy sets Optimal ﬂood control. Esogbue, Theologidu, and 
Guo (1992 ) 
Stochastic 
programming 
Transportation planning in 
disaster response. 
Barbarosoglu and Arda 
(2004 ) 
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sas in “dynamic risk assessment”] as being to do with the extent to
hich the risk assessment is performed - on a continuing basis, as
pposed to a once-for-all snapshot ( Adams, 1995; van Nederpelt,
012 ). For example, the UK’s Fire Service Inspectorate deﬁnes dy-
amic risk assessment within the bounds of an ongoing incident
s “the continuous assessment of risk in the rapidly changing circum-
tances of an operational incident, in order to implement the control
easures necessary to ensure an acceptable level of safety ” ( HM Fire
ervice Inspectorate, 1998 ). This approach is, of course, strongly to
e preferred over any static or even episodic approach ( Borodzicz,
0 05; Gorrod, 20 04 ) but our use of the term ‘dynamic’ here con-
otes the additional attribute that knowledge of the likely dynam-
cs of the system and the causal mechanisms for those dynam-
cs give clues to the precursors of risk events deriving both from
ithin the system and from outside it ( Fuchs, Keiler, Sokratov, &
hnyparkov, 2013 ). In short, if we mobilize knowledge of why the
ystem behaves as it does, we have a better chance of perceiving
he origins of risk events originating both from within the system
r from its immediate environment. 
Second, although in a signiﬁcant class of systems (safety or mis-
ion critical systems) the role of humans is frequently critical, we
bserve little in the way of structured analysis of the role of hu-
an agents in the operation of the assessed system ( Hopkin, 2012 ).
Third, particularly in the case of CHASs, there is little analysis of
he role of knowledge in the interaction of the human agents with
he system under assessment ( Hillson & Murray-Webster, 2007 ). 
Fourth, it is not clear from the existing literature whether suﬃ-
ient emphasis is given in risk identiﬁcation and assessment to the
lural nature of the valuation of risk outcomes, by which we mean
he different valuations placed by different stakeholders on system
utcomes ( Checkland & Scholes, 1990; Clarke, 2001 ). 
.2. OR and disaster management 
The management of disasters and particularly ﬂood events, as
n important subset of CHASs has been of interest to the OR com-
unity for some time, in the form of disaster operations manage-
ent (DOM), and by inclusion emergency planning. Disaster op-
rations represent the set of activities performed before, during
nd after a sudden, devastating incidence that seriously disturbs
he functioning of a population and causes human, material, eco-
omic or environmental damages that are beyond the ability of
he affected population to cope with by using its own resources.
hus we consider it pertinent to also consider papers related to
mergency operations research (EOR), the distinction being cen-
ered on whether an emergency requires a routine or more serious
nd spontaneous response. Essentially, EOR has not limited itself
n the same way as DOM and includes all types of emergencies
nd not only those related to serious, spontaneous and disastrous
vents ( Simpson & Hancock, 2009 ). 
An examination of existing literature reveals that a hard OR ap-
roach (using for example, mathematical programming, simulation
nd statistical modeling) is the most commonly deployed approach
or DOM, while ‘soft’ OR techniques, are predominantly qualitative
n nature, remain underused despite their suitability to the domain
 Galindo & Batta, 2013; Simpson & Hancock, 2009 ). Our literature
eview resulted in the identiﬁcation of only one study that specif-
cally applied a ‘soft’ OR approach to disaster planning ( Gregory &
idgley, 20 0 0 ). A modiﬁed version of SSM was employed with the
im of supporting the planning of a multi-agency counseling ser-
ice that could be activated in the event of a disaster. Extending
he scope of our search to include emergency planning resulted in
he identiﬁcation of a further three papers using soft OR. These
nclude the use SSM for location planning of a new ﬁre station
 Hewitt, 2002 ) and SODA for improving knowledge managementn the NHS to better plan and deliver patient care ( Edwards, Hall,
 Shaw, 2005 ). 
Many of the activities performed under DOM, then, are ad-
ressed through the application of ‘hard’ OR methodologies. For
xample, the location of shelters in preparation for an evacuation
r, indeed, the evacuation itself, may best be addressed through
athematical location and transportation analyzes. Furthermore, 
iven the uncertainty associated with variables such as the loca-
ion and intensity of a disaster, these can be mapped well using
tatistics and probability models. Table 1 provides a summary. 
The literature reveals, however, that despite the apparent suit-
bility of the quantitative methods their impact on policymaking
nd practice has been relatively low ( Walker, 1981 ). This is pri-
arily the result of the lack of use of ‘soft’ OR approaches at the
nitial stages of a project to help structure and formulate prob-
ems that are by their nature dynamic, ill-deﬁned and disorganized
 Sherali, Carter, & Hobeika, 1991 ). An additional exacerbating fac-
or is the presence of multiple policy makers (or system owners).
ne of the primary strengths of quantitative methods is the clarity
ith which they represent an agreed reality, but where there are
ultiple outcome valuations and even multiple understandings of
eality, this singularity of representation becomes hindrance. 
. Deﬁnitions, general approach and scope of paper 
.1. Risk management process 
Risk management in general usage ( Morgan & Henrion, 1992;
SEPA, 2004; IRM et al., 2002 ) refers to a process of identiﬁca-
ion and assessment of the likelihood of occurrence and impact
f deleterious outcomes of an object in focus resulting from (po-
ential) risk events which may or may not be reiﬁed in a particu-
ar circumstance ( Alberts, Dorofee, & Marino, 20 08; ISO/IEC, 20 09;
toneburner, Goguen, & Feringa, 2002 ). We shall refer to the ob-
ect of this analysis as a system ( NIOSH, 1998 ), since, for it to be
orthy of consideration, it will be of a complexity and span of im-
act greater than a single, undifferentiated event. For example, one
ould refer to the effects analysis of a single ﬂood event, a single,
solated, hydraulic phenomenon, rather than to its risk analysis. It
s not the single ﬂood itself which is the subject of risk analysis,
ut the effect of the ﬂood on the environment and society in which
t takes place as a particular embodiment of an underlying system
f hydrological phenomena of which the particular ﬂood is but a
ingle example. 
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m  Risk management as a process, then, moves from identiﬁcation
and assessment to control , mitigation and consequence manage-
ment ( Moteff, 2005 ), seeking to accommodate inevitable resource
limitations within an action plan ( ISO/DIS, 2009 ) aimed at satis-
fying a set of outputs or consequences of the causative risk event
( Stoneburner et al., 2002 ). 
Risk identiﬁcation and assessment are key steps within any
risk management process, whether that takes place within supply
chain management ( Manui & Mentzer, 2008 ), construction projects
( Sun, Fang, Wang, Dai, & Lv, 2008 ), banking and ﬁnance ( Duca &
Peltonen, 2013 ), or disaster risk reduction ( Zaidi & Pelling, 2015 ).
Risk identiﬁcation and assessment were considered key priorities
of the Hyogo Disaster Reduction Framework ( ISDR, 2005 ), which
forms the key focus of this paper. Following the International Stan-
dards, Risk Identiﬁcation is deﬁned as the “process of ﬁnding, rec-
ognizing and describing risks”, which involves “the identiﬁcation of
risk sources, events, their causes and their potential consequences”
( ISO, 2009 ). Risk assessment is, then, the “overall process of risk
identiﬁcation, risk analysis, and risk evaluation”, making Risk Iden-
tiﬁcation a component part of risk assessment. Alternatively, risk
identiﬁcation and risk assessment can be seen as sequential steps
with the risk management process ( McEntire, 2015 ). 
The extensive US-based work sponsored by the US Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) exempliﬁes this approach, with pro-
grams examining a wide variety of threats to the security of US
citizens and assets (and by extension other developed countries).
Topics include food protection (University of Minnesota), maritime
security (Stevens Institute of Technology), terrorism (University of
Maryland) coastal and critical infrastructure risk assessment (Uni-
versities of N Carolina and Illinois) ( DHS, 2015 ). These studies (to
the extent that they are publicly available) exhibit a high degree
of sensitivity to the underlying dynamic mechanisms of the risks
which they are attempting to elucidate, for example, in the 30
projects falling under the START initiative on responses to terror-
ism ( Start, 2015 ). There is evidence that a holistic system approach
similar to that advocated here would be resonant with and con-
tributory to the ambitions of these programs to establish a com-
plete risk identiﬁcation their topic areas. 
3.2. Connections with strategic analysis methods 
There are striking resonances between the processes of strate-
gic management under uncertainty, (and, in particular, the use of
scenario planning to identify robust strategic responses) and of the
risk management of a system. Both are concerned with the identi-
ﬁcation of action plans aimed at maximizing desired outputs under
conditions of limited resources when there exists an uncertain tra-
jectory of the system state over time. Scenario planning is a tech-
nique common to the two areas of management, and recent work
( Powell, 2014 ) has shown the connection between scenario gener-
ation and the underlying dynamics of the system, the future be-
havior of which is being predicted. It is upon this underlying con-
nection that this present work is based. 
The outcome states of the system must be a consequence of the
starting conditions together with the dynamic mechanisms in op-
eration in the organization as affected by any exogenous inputs to
the system. These latter can be included in the analysis either ex-
plicitly as external ‘disruptions’, an approach favored implicitly in
much risk analysis ( Alexander & Sheedy, 2005; Morgan & Henrion,
1992 ), or by extending the boundary deﬁnition of the system-in-
focus, so as to include a suﬃciently wide set of system mecha-
nisms within the boundary of the system-in-focus as to allow the
treatment of disruptions as dynamic mechanisms within that sys-
tem. For example, in strategic work, the effect of a competitor’s
pricing policy can be treated either as a disruption external to the
system representing the ﬁrm or can be included as part of a widerarket model in which the ﬁrm sits ( Howard, Vidgen, Powell, &
owell, 2007; Powell & Swart, 2010 ) Here we take a dual position,
oth extending the boundaries of the system under risk analysis to
nclude threat mechanisms which can be predicted, and carrying
ut a vulnerability analysis of possible disruptions to the relevant
ynamic system mechanisms. 
.3. Contribution and utility of the work 
The merits of the method, then, can be summarized as follows.
1 Identiﬁcation of cross-functional risks between subsystems
of a CHAS (physical, social valuation and political) which are
not apparent when viewed separately. 
2 Auditable completeness in the risk analysis, in that each dy-
namic process is captured (and is agreed to have been cap-
tured) in the ID and an exhaustive examination of the effects
of disruptions can then be carried out. 
3 Improved cognition of risks . 
4 Connection of instigating, disruptive variable changes and
system effects . 
The utility of the work lies in the ability of the system rep-
esentation method used, namely Qualitative System Dynamics
QSD) ( Coyle, 1996 ) to capture dynamic system mechanisms in
uch a way as to mobilize a wide range of informants’ knowl-
dge and subsequently reveal underlying system mechanisms. The
ethod identiﬁes dynamic loops, resonant mechanisms which pro-
ide knowledge of the processes within the system. 
In the following section we illustrate the QSD method with a
odel of the potential ﬂooding of an electricity sub-station con-
ected to the UK national distribution grid and protected both
y a coffer arrangement (concrete or brick retaining enclosures
imed at preventing water ingress to the electrical transformers
nd switching installation) and by emergency pumps. 
. Modeling approach – Qualitative System Dynamics (QSD) 
.1. Disaster management analysis – role of qualitative methods 
Although the terms ‘disaster management’ and ‘critical HASs’
re not synonymous, there is considerable overlap: almost all dis-
sters are CHASs; almost all CHASs contain the seeds of disas-
er by virtue of their criticality. The key literature review on an-
lytical techniques for disaster operations management ( Altey &
reen, 2006 ) includes natural, man-made and humanitarian dis-
sters. Both it and the comparative work of Galindo and Batta
2013) show a strong predominance of quantitative modeling tech-
iques for the purposes of disaster mitigation, preparedness, re-
ponse and recovery. The proportion of qualitative studies that are
dentiﬁed as ‘Soft OR’ is less than 1 percent and that of ‘System
ynamics’ constitutes approx. 2 percent of studies. 
Galindo and Batta identify a category called ‘Conceptual Analy-
is’ which accounts for 16 percent of all papers surveyed by them,
he second largest category after ‘Math Programming’ (23 percent).
impson and Hancock, (2009) report similar low levels of qualita-
ive methods use. We argue that QSD provides for a structured ap-
roach for qualitative systems’ enquiry and that the application of
his technique is particularly well suited for conceptual analysis in
ulti-stakeholder environments, as is the case with multi-agency
lanning around disaster operations ( Gregory & Midgley, 20 0 0 ). 
A critical observation emerging from these reviews is that there
s a dearth of applications of Soft OR. Such problem structur-
ng methods offer opportunities for inclusive modeling approaches
e.g., through use of techniques like QSD and SSM in workshops
ith problem stakeholders and policy makers) thus improving the
anagerial product cognition, options identiﬁcation, assessment
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Fig. 1. Extract from electrical substation ﬂood example. 
Fig. 2. Indicative example of a dynamic loop extracted from an ID. 
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h  tc) from studies in emergency and disaster planning ( Simpson &
ancock, 2009 ). 
We recognize the existence of other qualitative approaches in
he elicitation of risk through stakeholder participation, for ex-
mple, through use of causal maps ( Ackermann, Howick, Quigley,
alls, & Houghton, 2014 ), the use of SSM for the purposes of
dentifying the organizational stakeholders ( Wang, Liu, & Mingers,
015 ). For the purposes of risk identiﬁcation in CHASs, however,
e feel that the abilities of QSD to represent speciﬁc system dy-
amics and to mediate between the qualitative expression of these
echanisms and any possible quantitative representation (for ex-
mple detailed simulation) are of particular importance. 
QSD is a well-documented and extensively used technique
 Coyle, 1996; Sterman, 20 0 0 ). It originates from the mainstream of
ystems Dynamics (hereafter SD) which deploys visual Inﬂuence
iagrams to structure numerical simulations. In its purely qual-
tative form (as used here), exploration of the system dynamics
nd behavior is not carried out through forcing departures from a
uantitative reference mode, or baseline model but by direct ap-
eal to the structure of the model. To the dedicated numerical
odeler this may seem restrictive and arbitrary, but it has distinct
dvantages and practicalities. 
Firstly, not all the variables of the simulation can be deﬁned
umerically, particularly as one moves from the representation of
he laws of physics towards the social domain; it may be possible
o deﬁne water depth , velocity 1 , probability of consumer supply loss
r even cost of a ﬂood in numerical terms, but the human impacts,
uch as the perceived risk to the community , are less easily made
umerical. 
Secondly, examination of the structure of a model can produce,
f itself, insight into those dynamic mechanisms which are signif-
cant in producing system output, since those mechanisms are ad-
mbrated directly from the complex system representation which
nderwrites the simulation rather than indirectly by observation of
ystem output. There is, of course, a disadvantage to this, in that
he qualitative methods do not directly predict or illustrate sys-
em output as such, but where that disadvantage is material and
critically) where the simulation variables can be adequately rep-
esented numerically, the numerical simulation and the qualitative,
tructural analysis can be carried out in a complementary manner;
hey are not mutually exclusive. 
The grammar of QSD diagrams is well known ( Coyle, 1996;
den, 1989; Sterman, 20 0 0 ). The key components and character-
stics are 
• An inﬂuence diagram (ID) representing the causal links in the
system, usually emerging from a facilitated focus group of in-
formed persons. 
• The descriptive variables should be well-deﬁned and commonly
understood by the informants 
• Descriptive variables are linked by arrows representing causal-
ity (as distinct from mere correlation). Positive correlations are
signiﬁed by a + sign attached to the arrow, negative correla-
tions by a − sign. For the reader’s convenience in diagrams,
negative causal arrows are frequently shown dotted. For visual
clarity, here arrows without signs are deemed positive. 
• Analysis of an ID consists, in brief, of the visual inspection of
the ID to extract key loops connecting variables, which repre-
sent key mechanisms of behavior within the system model of
the ID. 
• Manipulation of the connections within these causal loops
forms the basis for action planning, bearing in mind that the
behavior of each loop does not occur in isolation, there being1 Descriptive variables which appear in models are represented in italic script, 
hus . 
einterconnections between key dynamic mechanisms which col-
lectively produce the system behavioral output. 
Fig. 1 shows an extract from the full system model of the ﬂood- 
rone electrical substation described more fully below. 
Here we see a positive 2 causal link (in solid) indicating that if
he water level risk to substation increases, the (actual) likelihood of
isruption to supply will rise and that if the availability of emergency
umping capacity were to increase that water level risk would de-
rease (a negative sign on the arrow). In both cases other factors
ill bear upon the matter and the connections are neither linear,
or necessarily strong, in that further consideration may show that
he link, while present, may be attenuated for reasons not at ﬁrst
vident. 
The link between availability of emergency pumping capacity and
ater level risk to substation is shown dotted, since the polarity of
he causal connection is negative, i.e. as the pumping capacity in-
reases , the probability of water level risk decreases . 
.2. Analysis of IDs 
The method of analysis of Inﬂuence Diagrams (IDs, sometimes
alled causal loop diagrams or CLDs) is well-documented ( Coyle,
996, Powell & Coyle, 2005 ) but is summarized here for conve-
ience. It turns on the extraction from the ID of dynamic loops,
losed cyclic structures of causality. These operate in concert to de-
ermine the system output under the effect of disruptions deriving
rom variables both on the boundary of and within the system. An
D can contain many hundreds, even thousands of loops, and so
 combination of automatic loop identiﬁcation using, for example,
ensim ©, and visual inspection is used to prioritize these for the
ubsequent identiﬁcation of action aimed at manipulating their be-
avior towards the desired system output(s). Fig. 2 shows a simple
xample of a dynamic loop extracted from the full model. 2 Positive signs are suppressed in IDs in this paper for visual clarity. 
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Fig. 3. Interconnection of sub-models. 
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o  The loop describes the connection between a perception of the
likelihood of disruption to service and the consequential provision
of emergency pump capacity to defend the substation from rising
water levels. 
Such loops are used to initiate consideration of actions aimed
at manipulation of the overall system output, through the com-
bined action of the loops towards a set of outcomes desired by the
stakeholders. Loops are characterized by their speed and strength
of effect on system outputs and the speed of their action. The
loop shown in Fig. 2 , on the assumption that stand-by resources
are available (e.g. extra ﬁxed or transportable pumping), will be
quite quick in its action, whereas an allied mechanism which ex-
presses the response of longer term investment on drainage infras-
tructure, for example, will be slower acting. The categorization of
these mechanisms according to their strength of impact and the
speed of application of that impact provides an important ﬁltering
mechanism by which potential actions can be prioritized. 
The priority in general strategic management use of these
methods is to identify interventions (beneﬁcial disruptions) which,
because of the resonance effects within the loops, have sustained
effects. Mutatis mutandis , deleterious disruptions can cause contin-
uing, even amplifying disbeneﬁts, and examination of these un-
desired effects constitutes the equivalence of risk analysis at the
strategic level, in that the identiﬁcation of managerial action aimed
at negating these effects reduces the risk of their disrupting the
long term strategic implementation. 
In risk identiﬁcation however, as understood here, we are cen-
trally concerned with the identiﬁcation of the effects of disrup-
tions vis-à-vis the ‘steady state’ strategic agenda. This requires an
amendment to the analysis process deployed so as to concentrate
upon the likelihood of disruptions to desired system behavior by
changes in the input variables rather than focusing on sustained
effect. A ‘pulse’ of disrupted supply to a local region due to tran-
sient but severe wind speed increases may not be strategic, since
it will in time decay, but it is, nevertheless, the focus for the oper-
ational risk management and mitigation of the supply network of
which our substation forms a part. 
The risk identiﬁcation process, then, can be summarized as fol-
lows. 
a. Construction of an Inﬂuence Diagram (ID), usually by a focus
group of experts, covering the required span of managerial
interest. 
b. Identiﬁcation of those variables in the ID which have the ca-
pacity to act as disruptors of the system performance 
c. Examination of the dynamic processes in the ID, represented
by the loops (vide Fig. 2 ) 
d. Identiﬁcation of the effects of disruptions to those mecha-
nisms 
e. Expression of the risks identiﬁed thereby. 
In risk identiﬁcation, where there is a need to full coverage of
potential risks, we inspect, arrow by arrow, the causal mechanisms
which underwrite the loop performance under disruption, enquir-
ing at each step what the threats and response might credibly be.
This has to be done by consideration of each of the important
loops, since the risks emerging from consideration of an arrow in
one loop may well be different from the risks identiﬁed in another
mechanism. While this is onerous (a diagram may contain many
hundreds of loops) the effort involved is a function of the need for
completeness in the risk survey rather than from the method it-
self; a thorough Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) would
appear as resource-intensive for the same reason, viz . the need to
cover all reasonable risks. If the need for completeness can be re-
laxed, then the analytical workload can be reduced by prioritiz-
ing the examination of loops, in the preferred order fast + strong ,
slow + strong , fast + weak and lastly slow + weak . For subsequent action planning for risk mitigation/control and
onsequences management, the process is similar to that for
trategic analysis, namely that each arrow is inspected to deter-
ine what actions should be applied, subject to resource limita-
ions, in order to condition the mechanisms underlying each arrow
o as to achieve the desired system output, recognizing that there
ay be more than one ‘system owner’ judging the merit of an
ffect. 
It is worthy of note that even the simple example shown in
ig. 2 shows the way in which the qualitative modeling links
ogether three different but connected domains relevant to the
ooding of the substation, namely the physical realities of elec-
ricity supply and ﬂood defense, the perceptions of the vic-
ims/participants and the political realities of resource availability
see Fig. 3 ). It is this ability to combine the numerical and well-
eﬁned together with the ephemeral and socially constructed that
akes this hybrid approach a powerful contextualization tool for
etailed simulation. 
Fig. 3 illustrates the general architecture appropriate for model-
ng risk and safety in a CHAS. The physical model (center) will be
ominated by numerical modeling having an assumption of an en-
ineering or physical reality, while the other two sub-models can
ither assume a single, pre-negotiated reality agreed by stakehold-
rs or can contain multiple valuations and indeed beliefs about the
alidity or beneﬁts of outcomes and, not infrequently, about the
ery system itself. 
. General modeling and analysis procedure 
We now summarize the recommended modeling and analysis
rocedure, concentrating on the risk identiﬁcation section of the
SO 31,0 0 0 recommendations ( ISO/DIS, 20 09 ). 
.1. Modeling 
Using the architecture of Fig. 3 as a guideline, establish an inﬂu-
nce diagram detailing the physical realities of the system-in-focus
ogether with the associated social and political contexts. 
The social context and political/policy sub-models are usually
est undertaken by focus groups and care must be taken to ensure
hat the informants in the respective areas are suﬃciently compe-
ent through experience and knowledge to represent the relevant
reas. For example, it would be inappropriate for a local farmer
o construct a hydrological model detailing scouring, the dynamics
f water levels and other issues of physical fact. Equally it would
e inappropriate for a hydrologist to construct the component of
he model which dealt with the effects of ﬂooding on morale, risk
version by farmers and other socially constructed elements resid-
ng in the other parts of the model. This is not to say that each is
orbidden from contributing to other sections of the hybrid model,
erely that the modeler should take care that authority is placed
here it belongs. 
In the case of the model presented here, an ID was built up
ver a period of 10 weeks, in short workshops, the contributors to
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shich included specialist hydrologists, a chartered electrical engi-
eer, together with citizens and disaster/crisis management prac-
itioners. The process of generation was the standard one adopted
n qualitative SD, where a facilitator enables the production, do-
ng the physical diagram construction, and who then reads back
he work to participants having checked oﬄine for grammar, deﬁ-
ition compliance and completeness with respect to the conversa-
ion from which the diagram emerged. The ID, then, although quite
imple, is an accurate and agreed representation of a conversation
mongst informed specialists. 
.2. Characterization of the descriptive variables 
The descriptive variables in the ID are examined for inherency
nd output signiﬁcance . These are, respectively, the extent to which
 variable’s value is subject to changes induced by factors outside
he system (for example, rainfall ) and the signiﬁcance of the vari-
ble as a measure of output, i.e. the target of the system manage-
ent. The importance of high inherency variables is that they have
he potential to be instigators of exogenously derived change in the
ystem and hence to be the causal factors for changes in the risks
herein. 
.3. Loop and chain extraction and categorization 
Using the well-documented methods of QSD ( Powell & Coyle,
005 ) extract those closed cycles of causality (dominant loops)
hich are signiﬁcant in the operation of the system-in-focus. This
s best done by a combination of automatic and inspection meth-
ds. These loops can conveniently be categorized by their speed of
peration and strength of inﬂuence on the overall system outputs
s judged by the stakeholders. 
Chains of causality linking high inherency variables to loops
ontaining variables of high output signiﬁcance are identiﬁed at
his stage. 
.4. Loop analysis and threat identiﬁcation 
Each (signiﬁcant) loop is then examined, arrow-by-arrow to de-
ermine what factors and agents, both purposive (i.e. intentional)
nd unintentional may operate so as to disrupt the operation of
hat component of each loop. This provides an exhaustive analysis
ot only of threats and internal risk factors but of the likely im-
act of the threat or factor on the operating mechanisms of the
ystem, what we will refer to from now on as the threat inter-
ention mechanisms. Moreover, since the architecture of Fig. 3 re-
uires modeling of the context in which the system-in-focus sits,
he threat identiﬁcation process is thorough and complete, to the
xtent that the model is a suﬃciently broad representation of the
ystem and context. 
An important part of this threat identiﬁcation process is con-
ideration of the effects of changes in the high inherency variables
pon the dynamic state of the system, and in particular, upon the
ehavior of the loops 
This process can be time-consuming and should be carried out
o a depth suﬃcient to ensure threat analysis of all signiﬁcant
ynamic loops is completed. As with any risk analysis, judgment
ust be applied as to the resource appropriate for the task. In gen-
ral terms it is necessary to analyze fully all those loops which are
udged by the informants to be signiﬁcant to the system outputs. 
.5. Further analysis 
There are a number of further analyzes which can be done, the
etails of which we leave to later work. These are aimed at theitigation and consequence/effect management parts of the pro-
ess. As far as risk and threat identiﬁcation are concerned, a useful
urther activity is to gather together the threat intervention mech-
nisms for each threat or factor. This then provides a convenient
ocus for the assessment and management of the threats and risk
actors for the system. 
. Illustrative example – ﬂood threat to an electricity 
ub-station 
.1. Physical sub-model 
Fig. 5 below shows the physical sub-model, extracted from
he full ID of Fig. 4 . It assumes a single substation with a cof-
er arrangement, (i.e. a permanent concrete barrier wall to protect
gainst high water levels in the immediate surrounding area) some
un-away drainage facility and some limited emergency pumping
rrangements which can be brought into play as the likelihood
f coffer breach rises. The substation supplies the national grid
hrough a regional distribution net. Ultimately electricity supply,
oth domestic and commercial, is made though the grid, but loss
f supply from the substation will affect local consumers, a loss of
upply which, in normal circumstances, can quickly be made up by
egional and national provision. However, if the surrounding sup-
ly network is also under threat of loss of supply, this make-up
ay not be available. 
To the left side of Fig. 5 can be seen some weather-derived vari-
bles such as wind speed and rainfall which, by their own direct
ffect and through their effect on the water-table, will prejudice
he integrity of the substation and, indeed, the surrounding supply
etwork. 
Fig. 5 was constructed by the focus groups not to answer the
etailed design question for the layout of the substation, but to
nvestigate the management of substation supply failure. As such
t is concerned not just with actualities – windspeed , rainfall - but
n some cases with predictions and forecasts - predicted rainfall for
ext 48 hours , potential damage to surrounding distribution grid , pre-
icted wind speed - since these latter will affect the surrounding
ocial valuation sub-model as much as do actual system variables.
he ‘physical model’ here, then, includes the surrounding causal
actors such as weather, then physicalities of the substation itself
nd certain predicted variables which will affect the social valua-
ion system, to which we now turn. 
.2. Social valuation sub-model 
Fig. 6 (again extracted from the full ID of Fig. 4 ) shows both
he social valuation sub-model (variables in bold ) and the political
ub-model (variables underlined ). 
The mechanisms represented here by the informants focus on
erceived risk and perceived likelihood of disruption as well as on
ctual effects, since consumers/victims of disaster are (in the gen-
ral case) are unable to measure actual risk but are predictive in
heir cognition. Their primary engagement here is between antic-
pated effect and the availability of funding long term (‘projects’)
nd short term (‘maintenance’), an interaction between physical
ctuality/prediction, the social valuation of that prediction and the
olitical system through the exertion of pressure for resources to
e applied. This observation that political pressure and effect is
chieved by socially-derived pressure resulting from both percep-
ion/prediction and by actuality is expected, but the ability to in-
estigate the effects of these mechanisms in a disciplined an com-
lete fashion is worthy of note. 
Fig. 7 shows the links (shaded) back into the physical model as
he effect of political pressure results in the (re)allocation of re-
ources. 
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Fig. 4. Shows the full ID of the illustrative example of ﬂood threat to an electricity substation with the three sub-models delineated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i  
t  
s  
a  
p  
d  
d  
b
 
h  
f  
b  
o  
a  
w  
i  
p  
a  
r  
n  
a  
i  
t  
f  
i  
r  
g  
b  
p  
e  
a  
c6.3. Loop analysis 
In its standard form, qualitative SD stresses the importance of
identifying closed loops within the ID, the examination of which
forms the basis for the identiﬁcation of managerial action ( Coyle,
1996, Powell & Coyle, 20 05, Sterman, 20 0 0 ). There are two canon-
ical forms. The resonant (or runaway) loop, where ampliﬁcation
around the loop is greater than 1 and the goal-seeking form, where
ampliﬁcation round the loop is less than 1. In the former a change
to one of the loop variables propagates around the loop, provid-
ing, in theory at least, an ever-increasing (or decreasing) effect.
The argument in conventional system dynamics analysis is that if a
closed resonant mechanism can be identiﬁed, it provides a poten-
tial for continuing effect from an intervention, as distinct from the
‘single shot’ of an intervention applied to an open causal chain. In
the latter, the goal-seeking loop, because the ampliﬁcation round
the loop is less than unity, any step change decays over time. 
In risk identiﬁcation, however, there are issues with such a
purist approach. While the continuing effect of an intervention into
a closed loop remains signiﬁcant, we are equally concerned with
the one-off effect of a single step-change, such as (in the case of
our electricity substation example here) a sudden increase in rain-
fall or, indeed, a decrease in funding availability for the provision
of emergency resource. In both cases we need to consider whether
the effect of the step change will itself be transient or whether
it will, through resonant mechanisms in the system structure (i.e.
loops) continue to propagate after the one-off causal event. 
6.4. Inherency 
Take, for example, the disruption of a ‘pulse’ of rainfall. In some
system structures such a discrete event will produce an increasen the likelihood of disruption of supply only for the duration of
he ‘pulse’ of rainfall and a short time afterwards. In other system
tructures (say, where the effect of the rainfall increase is to cause
 breakdown of the substation coffering because of increased water
ressure) the effect will be catastrophic, causing a sustained and
ramatic increase in the likelihood of supply loss. The approach
escribed here allows categorization of threats on that structural
asis. 
Table 2 contains information on the ‘inherency’ of variables. In-
erency measures the propensity of the variable to change due to
actors outside the system as distinct from its propensity to change
ecause of system effects; it is thus an indication of the propensity
f the variable to act as a disruptor to the system. Thus a bound-
ry variable with no (system) inputs will have a high inherency,
hereas a highly connected variable may be subject to change but
f the majority of that change derives from variables which are in-
uts to it, its inherency will be low. In Table 2 the variables which
re shaded are considered to have the propensity to change for
easons other than changes in the variable to which they are con-
ected. Note that this is not the same as the propensity of a vari-
ble to change in an absolute sense. For example, rainfall has high
nherency because it is subject to change but not through its in-
eraction with the remainder of the system in focus. Predicted rain-
all , on the other hand is just as subject to change, but has low
nherency because that change is wholly attributable to factors al-
eady represented in the system. Thirdly, press interest has a de-
ree of inherency because although most of the press interest will
e generated by the factors represented in the system, there is a
ossibility that there could be a rise in media interest because of
vents outside the narrow conﬁnes of the model of Fig. 4 , say if
 major ﬂood event occurs in an adjacent area, raising afresh con-
erns which up, until that time, were latent. 
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Fig. 5. Physical sub-model. 
Fig. 6. Social valuation and political sub-models. 
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Fig. 7. Links back into physical sub-model as a result of political action. 
Table 2 
Tabulation of inherent mutability of variables [or ‘inherency’] and output signiﬁcance (H = High; L = Low, M = Medium). 
Variable Inherency Output 
Wind speed H Independent variable 
Predicted wind speed L Highly dependent on actual wind speed 
Potential damage to surrounding user distribution system L Factors included 
Water table level L Dependent on rainfall 
Rainfall H Independent variable 
Upstream catchment L Fixed capacity 
Predicted rainfall for next 48 hours L Some possibility of exogenous risk 
Water level risk to substation – Dependent on system variables 
Risk to community – Dependent on system variables H 
Capacity of surrounding system to provide alternative supply M Some possibility of risks in surrounding system 
Likelihood of physical breach to coffer L Dependent on rainfall 
Availability of emergency pumping capacity L Dedicated to local use 
Extent of maintenance of drainage L Factors included in model 
Effectiveness of run off L Factors included in model 
Likelihood of physical breach to runoffs L Factors included in model 
(Actual) likelihood of disruption to supply L Some possibility of risks in surrounding system H 
Perceived likelihood of immediate disruption to supply L Factors included in model H 
Perceived risk to community L ‘word of mouth’ dominated by local press H 
Perceived likelihood of disruption to users L ‘word of mouth’ dominated by local press H 
Level of press interest M Possibility of other news stories provoking interest 
External funding L Factors included 
Cost of emergency measures – Dependent on system variables 
Amount of resource applied to emergency measures L Hypothecated funding 
Funds of short term maintenance L Factors included in model 
Cost of maintenance L Factors included in model 
Amount of resource applied to long term projects L Factors included in model 
Funds for ‘projects’ L Factors included 
Available funds M Factors included in model 
External funding L Factors included in model 
Local/regional funding L Factors included in model 
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sIn terms of risk identiﬁcation, then, we look to the variables
ith high inherency as being the ones most likely to be the source
f disruptive changes to the system of concern to us. 
.5. Output signiﬁcance 
Table 2 characterizes the variables according to their output sig-
iﬁcance (right hand column), by which we mean the importance
f changes to that variable as viewed from the perspective of the
ystem owner. 
There are ontological diﬃculties here, to be sure; it is not al-
ays clear who the system owner is or even whether there is a
ingle incumbent. Moreover, the system owner (in the sense of the
gency which directly controls the relevant resources) may not be
he same as the most signiﬁcant stakeholder (in the sense of the
gency most affected by system outputs). We deal with these mat-
ers methodologically in a separate paper. Here it suﬃces to as-
ume that the system owner is the regional distribution authority
RDA) and whose motivations are consistent with ensuring reliable,
redictable electricity supply to the local community. There are nu-
nces here; we are not assuming that the RDA will act locally in
pposition to the wider interests of maintenance of supply. Neither
re we assuming that maintenance of local supply will be done in
pposition to the longer term interests of the RDA, so that sympa-
hy with the surrounding political and social valuation contexts is
ppropriate for the RDA in determining its actions. 
The right hand column of Table 2 details the importance of each
ariable to the system owner. It is important to distinguish here
etween implied importance and output importance. Each con-
ected variable will have implied signiﬁcance, but only a few will
ave direct impact on the stakeholders’ valuation. Here we identify
 variables of high signiﬁcance, including risk to community , ( ac-
ual) likelihood of disruption to supply and level of press interest . This
ast, together with two variables ( potential damage to surrounding
ser distribution system and cost of emergency measures ) evaluated
s of medium signiﬁcance, reﬂect the wider interests of the RDA in
ediating between the narrow responsibility to provide supply to
sers and the need to maintain strategic relationships. 
.6. Chain/loop identiﬁcation 
The heart of the risk identiﬁcation analysis method using dy-
amic system knowledge is in understanding and examining the
onnections between variables of high inherency, likely to cause
isruptions to the system state (instigating variables), and variables
f high output signiﬁcance. The former capture the inputs to the
ystem from which risks derive; the latter are the basis for the
valuation by interested parties of the system output or state. 
We can therefore consider the topology of the system under ex-
mination as consisting of two related parts, namely that portion
omprising the set of variables which form elements of loops (con-
ected variables) and a set of instigating variables which have high
nherency and which are capable of creating disruptions to those
oops. It should be observed that this latter set can include both
ariables which are not members of loops and connected variables.
The process of analysis then, is to identify key dynamic loops
nd to examine these for the effects of high inherency variables in
rder to determine the effect of disruptions produced by changes
n the instigating variables. This then provides an auditable basis
or the identiﬁcation of risks material to the system output. 
The standard approach in qualitative SD is to use a combination
f tool-based methods and visual inspection to identify dominant
oops. The application used here, Vensim ©, allows the tabulation
f loops which contain a particular highlighted variable as well as
he tabulation of causal connections into and out of a selected vari-
ble. Consider Fig. 8 . Here we have separated into the delineated area
ll those variables which form components of at least one loop.
his separation is straightforward; the variable rainfall , for exam-
le has no causal arrows entering it. Hence, it cannot be part of
 closed loop, and by extension, neither can upstream inﬂow (the
uantity of water upstream of the substation which has the poten-
ial to overwhelm its coffer) since the only input to the latter is
ainfall . 
Fig. 8 also distinguishes instigating variables (in boxes) and high
utput signiﬁcance variables (in hexagons). The essence of our pro-
edure is, through a tabulated approach, to identify the effects of
he boxed variables, via the system dynamics, on the output vari-
bles. 
The instigating variables can affect the loop dynamics indirectly.
ee Fig. 9 , where the connections between rainfall, an unconnected
nstigating variable and connected variables are elucidated. Rain-
all can affect amount of resource applied to emergency measure
irectly, but also affects, for example, perceived risk to community
hrough the intermediation of predicted rainfall and ( perceived) like-
ihood of immediate disruption . 
Were we to follow a narrow loop-based analysis, we would
ail, then, to identify risks deriving from the instigating variables,
een as extra-systemic critical event source variables, by which we
ean those variables such as rainfall and windspeed which fall out-
ide the system in that neither the system owner nor the variables
eﬁning the system have any inﬂuence over them. 
.7. Procedure 
The procedure adopted, then is, to identify 
(a) The loops present in the ID and characterizing them as res-
onant or goal-seeking, slow or fast and strong or weak. See
Table 3 , which contains a selection of loops drawn from Fig.
4 and selected on the basis of their perceived effect on the
system performance output. 
(b) For each loop identify the initiating variables which can ma-
terially affect, either directly or indirectly, the loop perfor-
mance. 
(c) For each loop, tabulate the risks deriving from the effect of
the relevant instigating variables. 
. Results 
Using the aforementioned procedure results in a set of struc-
ures which have been extracted from the ID and which constitute
he most inﬂuential causal paths by which instigating variables can
ffect the signiﬁcant output of the system. 
Even this relatively simple ID contains over 100 loops, the com-
lete analysis of which would be both onerous and unnecessary,
ot least because of the duplication and overlapping of many of
he loops. Selection of the appropriate subset is carried by visual
nspection, ensuring that loops which contain the high output vari-
bles are taken into consideration and that, at least for the risk
dentiﬁcation problem, all accessible parts of the ID are covered by
he set of loops selected for analysis. Five loops are shown (col-
mn 2) and described brieﬂy (column 3) in Table 3 , the full set
onsisting of some 20 considered to provide adequate coverage. 
Column 4 of Table 3 then indicates whether each loop is fast
r slow , strong in its system effect or weak and resonant or goal-
eeking . This typology allows prioritization of loop analysis, since,
or example, fast , strong resonant loops will have the most effect
n system performance when disrupted by changes in instigating
ariables, while weak, goal-seeking loops will be less inﬂuential. 
The next step is to identify the manner in which the instigat-
ng variables are likely to have an effect on each loop and this is
ummarized in column 5 of the table. 
560 J.H. Powell et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 254 (2016) 550–564 
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eConsideration of the effect of changes in the dynamic state of
the loop, particularly with regard to the effect on the loop per-
formance of a step change in an instigating variable, allows the
content of column 6 to be built up, and this constitutes the risk
analysis which is the aim of the process. Mitigation and control
measures associated with these risks can then be carried out in an
appropriate manner, again informed by the visibility of the under-
lying system dynamics. 
8. Discussion and conclusion 
Examination of the identiﬁed risks (column 6) shows that many
of them thrown up by the process are to be expected; it is obvi-
ous, for example, that a step change in rainfall would produce the
risk that (03–6) “Drainage capacity [would be] insuﬃcient in capac-
ity for predicted rainfall increase ” or that (04–2) “available funds
may be subject to external reduction/increase ”. Others are less intu-
itive, such as the risk (05–2) that “arrival of emergency equipment
[could be] misinterpreted as indicating inevitable disruption OR as ev-
idence that there is no residual risk to community”, supplemented by
(01–4) “Increased deployment of pumps and other equipment causes
public alarm over severity of the situation”. 
The appearance of such risks illustrates the ability of the ap-
proach to encompass risks which fall across the boundaries of the
three sub-models, allowing, for example, communication between
parties focusing on physical aspects of design and parties fusing on
operational matters to take a common connected view. In the case
of the unexpected risk that the arrival of pumping equipment, in-
tended to allay public concern and reduce the actual likelihood of
supply loss, could cause a rise in public concern with undesirable
effects elsewhere, is a good example of this cross-communication.Fig. 8. Delineated area includes all variables capable of being in loops. Init is easy retrospectively to claim that such a risk would be “obvi-
us to an experienced manager/designer” but the adumbration of
hese cross-functional risks can only help to improve the risk iden-
iﬁcation process as a whole. 
.1. Scalability considerations 
The example presented here is, for the purposes of illustration,
 compact and limited one, but the scalability of the method to
arger systems is entirely possible. One of the characteristics of soft
R methods (including the System Dynamics corpus utilized here)
s their ability to adjust the resolution of modeling according to the
eeds of analysis. Thus, in the present example, the disaster man-
ger’s need may well be to identify detailed risks, since the extent
f the problem is limited. In the case of a CHAS of much wider
xtent (for example, in the case of ﬂooding of a whole region) the
isk identiﬁcation, at least at the initial assessment period, can be
ore generalized, working down in resolution as policy itself more
ecomes more focused in its application. 
The method has been applied to large scale ﬂooding examples
the UK Somerset Levels and Thames Valley ﬂoods of 2014) and,
ndeed to the highly complex management of the Ebola epidemic
n West Africa of 2014–2015), the reports of which are in prepara-
ion, and which form extensions of the present work towards the
ssues of human agency and knowledge gaps, respectively. 
.2. Critique and further work 
There are a number of counter-arguments which could be lev-
led at this approach to risk identiﬁcation. tiating variables in boxes, output variables in hexagons (as Table 3 ). 
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Fig. 9. Chains connecting rainfall with high signiﬁcant output variables. 
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here. Firstly, the approach appears deliberately to reject the use of
umerical data. In fact the qualitative SD approach allows the mo-
ilization of numerical data where it is available, but is not limited
n its analysis by the absence if such. In addition to the obvious
rgument that not all factors, particularly those in the social val-
ation and logical sub-models, can be made numerical, the con-
entration on structural analysis allows generalizable observations
o be made about system behaviors. Now admittedly those gener-
lized statements are less precise than those deriving from a nu-
erical model, but they do, in contrast, allow a breadth of anal-
sis which the narrow strictures of quantitative work necessarily
orbid. 
Secondly, we are aware that the method elucidated here is time
onsuming, if all potential system dynamic loops are to be ex-
mined. In many cases rich IDs can exhibit many thousands of
oops. This, however, is a problem faced by all dynamic analyzes
nd, moreover is one shared with all thorough risk analysis ap-
roaches. On would observe, ﬁrst, that the practice of selecting
oops for examination on a visual inspection basis is common and
ell-documented and, second, that a thorough risk analysis is re-
ource intensive not because of the complexity of the modeling so
uch as because of the need for thoroughness in the risk identi-
cation task. Completeness of analysis militates for effort in that
nalysis. 
Further work in this area continues to establish sound means of
ncorporating multiple viewpoints into the valuation analysis and
n establishing the role of knowledge in the instigation of risks in
ystems and further papers will cover these aspects. Of particular importance is the identiﬁcation of how the ability
f the qualitative method used here can be used to target subse-
uent investigations of a more numerical nature. While it is true
hat much of the system knowledge deployed in this approach
o risk identiﬁcation is by its nature qualitative, examination of
he loops contained in Table 2 will show that there is implic-
tly much which can be expressed in a quantitative fashion. In-
eed System Dynamics as a body of knowledge ( Sterman, 20 0 0 )
s well suited to this numerical simulation of quasi-numerical sys-
em variables. It possesses the capacity to progress from an ID to
 simulation structure relatively easily and the environment de-
loyed here, Vensim © has an automatic simulation structuring
ool within its standard embodiment which supports direct numer-
cal simulation extension from the qualitative approach deployed
ere. 
On a more localized basis, the identiﬁcation of those vari-
bles which are both signiﬁcant in the system dynamics and
re subjective to numerical expression proceeds easily from such
abulations as Table 2 . The method of numerical deﬁnition of
hose variables will, of course, vary from variable type to vari-
ble type. Rainfall is easy to measure empirically, whereas level
f press interest, may not be so convincingly expressed. Some
ariables, such as level of public concern , may have to be ex-
licitly investigated by questionnaire, entraining all the limi-
ations of structured surveys. In all cases, however, the rel-
vance of further numerically-based investigations can be tar-
eted more effectively by the auditable approach presented
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Table 3 
Summarizes the analysis for the substation example of Fig. 4 , covering a selection of loops for the purposes of illustration. 
No. Loop diagram Description/Objective Type Disruptions (chain effects) Inherent risk(s) 
01 Public perception drives 
press interest resulting in the 
application of emergency 
resources but this, itself 
increases perception of risk 
Strong Rainfall • Perceived risk 
to community 
• Amount of 
resource applied 
to emergency 
measures 
01–1 A rise in public perception that 
emergency services or other 
essential infrastructure is at 
risk may cause unwelcome 
press interest. 
Fast 
Windspeed 
• Perceived risk 
to community 
01–2 Press focus may cause concern 
in the public mind over the 
possibility (real or imaginary) 
of supply disruptions 
Resonant 
Available 
funds 
• Amount of 
resource applied 
to emergency 
measures 
01–3 Public pressure may militate 
for deployment of emergency 
equipment, depleting ﬂexibility 
01–4 Increased deployment of 
pumps and other equipment 
causes public alarm over 
severity of the situation. 
02 Increased press interest will 
drive public perceptions that 
supply is threatened and 
therefore perceived 
expectation of risk. 
Strong Rainfall • Perceived risk 
to community 
02–1 As 01–1 
Fast 
Windspeed 
• Perceived risk 
to community 
02–2 As 01–2 
Resonant 
Available 
funds 
• Perceived risk 
to community 
(through 
emergency 
resource 
application) 
02–3 Public concern over potential 
supply loss fuels wider concern 
over risk to infra-structure and 
emergency services 
03 Concerns about disruption 
motivates local/regional 
administrative authorities to 
allocate funds aimed at 
maintaining drainage so that 
ﬂood water pulses can be run 
off. This reduces the risk of 
defenses being overwhelmed 
which reduces risk. 
Strong Rainfall • Water level 
risk to 
substation 
• Amount of 
resource applied 
to emergency 
measures 
03–1 Public concern is artiﬁcially 
heightened resulting in 
inappropriate pressure to 
increase funding, jeopardizing 
good long term ﬁnancial 
control 
Slow 
Windspeed 
• Water level 
risk to 
substation 
03–2 Public pressure demands 
inappropriate short term 
resource allocation (see 03–5) 
Goal- 
seeking 
03–3 Time pressure and need for 
visible action on physical state 
of runaways induces 
sub-optimal project 
performance. 
03–4 Poor physical state of drainage 
increases likelihood of defenses 
being overwhelmed. 
03–5 Need for allocation of resources 
to cosmetics of infrastructure 
diverts effort from remedial 
work. 
03–6 Drainage insuﬃcient in 
capacity for predicted rainfall 
increase 
04a,b 
available funds
amount of resource
applied to long term
projects
funds for short term
maintenance
funds for
'projects'
-
amount of resource
applied to emergency
measures
cost of emergency
measures
-
Two loops a and b 
summarize the ﬁnancial 
reality that short and 
long-term expenditure 
reduces the available funds. 
Strong Available 
funds 
• Direct effect 04–1 Threat that over-expenditure 
on short term measures will 
exacerbate pressure on longer 
term projects and vice versa . 
Fast Rainfall • Amount of 
resource applied 
to emergency 
measures 
04–2 Available funds may be subject 
to external reduction/increase 
Goal- 
seeking 
Level of 
press 
interest 
• Available funds 04–3 Effect of weather will induce 
unavoidable expenditure on 
short-term measures, thereby 
unexpectedly reducing 
available funds 
04–4 Suﬃcient press interest may 
distort funding processes 
( continued on next page ) 
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Table 3 ( continued ) 
No. Loop diagram Description/Objective Type Disruptions (chain effects) Inherent risk(s) 
05 An increased likelihood of 
disruption instigates the 
deployment of local supply 
measures (generators). As a 
result local concern falls, 
taking pressure off the need 
to apply emergency resources 
in to pumping, so that, 
counter-intuitively, the 
disruption likelihood rises 
further. 
Fast Rainfall • Water level 
risk to 
substation 
• Actual 
likelihood of 
disruption 
(through damage 
to surrounding 
grid) 
• Perceived 
likelihood of 
disruption 
• Amount of 
resource applied 
to emergency 
measures 
05–1 Risk of over-stressing 
responsive supply-maintenance 
measures at the expense of 
preventative measures 
Weak 
Windspeed 
• Actual 
likelihood of 
disruption 
(through damage 
to surrounding 
grid) 
• Perceived 
likelihood of 
disruption 
05–2 Risk of arrival of emergency 
equipment being 
misinterpreted as indicating 
inevitable disruption OR as 
evidence that there is no 
residual risk to community. 
Resonant 
Available 
funding 
• Amount of 
resource applied 
to emergency 
measures 
05–3 signiﬁcant rainfall and/or wind 
may cause disruption to 
surrounding supply grid 
causing rise in likelihood of 
disruption 
Press 
interest 
• Perceived 
likelihood of 
disruption 
05–4 High levels of press interest 
may exacerbate public concern 
causing over-reaction 
05–5 as 04–2 
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